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Samuel R. Bagenstos

Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting
Rights After Shelby)
abstract. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, voting rights
activists proposed a variety of legislative responses. Some proposals sought to move beyond
measures that targeted voting discrimination based on race or ethnicity. They instead sought to
eliminate certain problematic practices that place too great a burden on voting generally.
Responses like these are universalist, because rather than seeking to protect any particular group
against discrimination, they formally provide uniform protections to everyone. As Bruce
Ackerman shows, voting rights activists confronted a similar set of questions—and at least some
of them opted for a universalist approach—during the campaign to eliminate the poll tax.
Universalist responses have many possible strengths: tactically, in securing political
support for and broader judicial implementation of laws that promote civil rights interests;
substantively, in aggressively attacking the structures that lead to inequality; and expressively, in
emphasizing human commonality across groups. But they have possible drawbacks along all
three of these dimensions as well. Although scholars have addressed some of these strengths and
drawbacks in the context of specific proposals for civil rights universalism, no work has
attempted to examine these issues comprehensively. This essay attempts such an examination.
author. Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Rick Hasen, Sam
Issacharoff, Ellen Katz, Rick Pildes, and, as always, Margo Schlanger, for comments on earlier
drafts.
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introduction
After the Supreme Court invalidated the core of the Voting Rights Act’s
preclearance regime in Shelby County v. Holder,1 civil rights activists proposed a
variety of legislative responses. One set of responses, which gained quick favor
in influential precincts in the legal academy, sought to move beyond measures
like the Voting Rights Act that targeted voting discrimination based on race or
ethnicity. These responses instead sought to eliminate certain problematic
practices that place too great a burden on any individual’s vote.2 I will call
responses like these universalist (or, sometimes, universalistic), because rather
than seek to protect any particular group against discrimination, they provide
uniform protections to everyone (at least as a formal matter). As Bruce
Ackerman shows in his latest We the People volume, voting rights activists
confronted a similar decision regarding whether to pursue a universal
approach—and at least some of them opted for universalism—during the
campaign to eliminate the poll tax.3
The voting rights context is hardly unique. Across an array of different
contexts, scholars and activists have proposed universalist responses to address
problems that group-oriented civil rights approaches have not fully resolved.
These contexts include affirmative action in higher-education admissions,
regulation of the employment relationship, disability inequality, and the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment generally.4 My own work has
often advocated such universalist responses to civil rights problems.5

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
The most notable set of proposals in this regard came from Samuel Issacharoff’s Beyond the
Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013) [hereinafter Issacharoff,
Discrimination Model], which builds on themes Issacharoff sounded earlier in Samuel
Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1710 (2004). Issacharoff’s longtime collaborator, Richard Pildes, provided the first
comprehensive defense of a turn to a universalist approach while the 2006 Voting Rights
Act reauthorization was pending. See Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy:
From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOWARD L.J. 741 (2006). For other notable
examples, see Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58
(2014); and Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014).
See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 83-126 (2014).
See infra Part I.
See, e.g., SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 51-54, 145 (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS] (advocating

2840

universalism and civil rights

Universalist responses have many possible strengths: tactically, in securing
political support for and broader judicial implementation of laws that promote
civil rights interests;6 substantively, in aggressively attacking the structures
that lead to inequality;7 and expressively, in avoiding essentializing identity
and emphasizing human commonality across groups.8 But they have possible
drawbacks along all three of these dimensions as well. Scholars who advocate
universalist approaches to civil rights problems have too often conflated the
tactical, substantive, and expressive arguments for these positions or simply
focused on whichever of these dimensions supports a universalistic position
without considering the others. These errors, I will argue, have led those
scholars to be unduly sanguine about the effectiveness of universalism in the
civil rights context.
To assess the effectiveness of universalistic approaches to civil rights—
whether in general or in a particular case—requires examination of each of
three dimensions: tactics, substance, and expressivism. As I hope to show in
this essay, when considered along all of these dimensions, neither universalistic
nor particularistic approaches can fully address our civil rights problems. Even
in any specific context—whether voting, higher education, employment,
disability, or the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment—a mix of
universalistic and particularistic approaches is likely to offer the most traction
in addressing those problems.9 And determining the proper mix of policies will
require a highly context-specific analysis. Nonetheless, there are some common
dynamics of universalistic and targeted civil rights policies, and these dynamics
offer lessons for policymakers approaching any given civil rights context. In
this essay, I aim to draw out some of these general lessons and then sketch how
they might apply to the civil rights context in which questions of universalism
are most acute at the moment—voting discrimination. I argue, against

6.
7.
8.
9.

universal health insurance and universal workplace accommodation requirements to address
problems of disability inequality); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social
Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225 (2013) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Employment Law] (arguing
that universal provisions of employment law can serve equality interests).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
In this regard, my prescription accords with that of Desmond King and Rogers Smith in
DESMOND S. KING & ROGERS M. SMITH, STILL A HOUSE DIVIDED: RACE AND POLITICS IN
OBAMA’S AMERICA (2011). See also Rogers M. Smith, Ackerman’s Civil Rights Revolution and
Modern American Racial Politics, 123 YALE L.J. 2906 (2014).
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Professor Issacharoff and others, that the response to Shelby County will fail
unless it goes well beyond universal protections of voting rights. Rather, the
voting rights regime must also provide robust protection against race
discrimination specifically.
i. examples of universalist approaches to civil rights law
At this point, readers may be wondering exactly what I mean by
universalist approaches to civil rights law, and how important the debate over
universalism is to civil rights controversies. This Part provides some answers to
these questions. I begin, in Section I.A, by offering the working definition of
universalism that will guide my analysis in this essay. As I explain, mine is not
the only definition of universalism one could employ, and I do not offer it as a
way to draw a crisp line between what does and does not come within the
category. Rather, I offer it simply as a serviceable device for identifying and
assessing an important phenomenon in debates over civil rights law. In Section
I.B, I identify a number of contexts in which advocates and scholars have urged
universalist solutions to civil rights problems. I begin with an historical
example from Professor Ackerman’s book—the debate over the poll tax—
before turning to present-day examples.
A. A Working Definition of Universalism
As I show throughout this essay, scholars have proposed deemphasizing
targeted approaches to civil rights problems and instead emphasizing
universalist approaches across a range of contexts. But what do I mean by
“universalist”? For purposes of this essay, I define a universalist approach to
civil rights law as one that either guarantees a uniform floor of rights or
benefits for all persons or, at least, guarantees a set of rights or benefits to a
broad group of people not defined according to the identity axes (e.g., race,
sex) highlighted by our antidiscrimination laws. What is crucial for my
purposes is not just that members of different identity groups are entitled to be
treated the same as each other under a universalistic statute, but that we can
determine each individual’s entitlement without considering identity groups at
all. By this definition, a law that guarantees all workers $10 per hour would be
universalistic. But a law that prohibits race discrimination in wages would not.
Under the former law, we can determine whether a worker’s rights have been
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violated without identifying her race or the race of anyone else. Under the
latter law, by contrast, we must identify the race of the worker who asserts a
violation of her rights, as well as the race of the workers whom she alleges
received better treatment, to make a cross-racial comparison.10
Nothing in my argument depends on the category of universalistic
approaches having a tight and impermeable boundary. The quality of
universalism may be best understood as lying on a spectrum, running from
more to less universalist. What I call universalistic strategies are often closely
intertwined in practice with strategies targeted to particular groups or axes of
discrimination. Indeed, my basic argument is that most civil rights problems
are best addressed by a mix of strategies, though the solutions to some should
place more emphasis on universalism and the solutions to others should place
more emphasis on targeting.
B. Examples of Universalistic Approaches to Civil Rights
As Professor Ackerman’s latest We the People volume highlights, arguments
in favor of universalistic approaches are hardly new. As Ackerman shows, in
the decades-long fight to eliminate the poll tax, advocates pursued two
different strategies. Many civil rights advocates saw the poll tax as one of
several means by which states discriminated against African-American voters.
Others, including President Franklin Roosevelt and even politicians such as
Senator Spessard Holland who supported racial discrimination in voting, saw
the problem of the poll tax in more general populist terms.11 They sought a flat
ban on the use of the poll tax as a voting qualification, without any inquiry into

10.

11.

Of course, one could understand laws prohibiting race discrimination as universalist to the
extent that they protected members of all races equally. But because laws that specifically
call attention to identity status share a set of dynamics that are different from the dynamics
of laws that do not require any reference to identity status—and because this difference is an
important one to explore—I treat those laws as targeted for purposes of my argument. In
that sense, my understanding of universalism is narrower than one some might offer. By
contrast, my understanding of a universalist approach is broader than the one employed by
Jessica Clarke, who excludes “traditional labor standards (i.e., the minimum wage as
opposed to equal pay) that do not find antecedents in antidiscrimination laws” from her
definition. Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace
Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1221 n.11 (2011). As I show in the remainder of this Part,
commentators have often proposed labor or welfare standards that do not find antecedents
in antidiscrimination laws (such as just-cause termination regimes and universal health
insurance) as a means of achieving civil rights goals.
See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 85-86.
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whether or when it discriminated on the basis of race. The universalistic
approach prevailed in the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which prohibited using
the poll tax as a qualification for voting in elections for federal office.12
Professor Ackerman shows that section 10 of the Voting Rights Act, which
directed the Attorney General to challenge poll taxes in states that still
employed them,13 contained elements of the universalistic and of the targeted
approaches.14
The Supreme Court ultimately chose the universal path to invalidating the
poll tax in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.15 As Professor Joey Fishkin
describes the developments in voting rights law in the 1960s and early 1970s:
“Rather than simply dismantling race discrimination in voting, American law
took a dramatic universalist turn, sweeping away almost all the bases of
suffrage restriction that remained in 1960 and establishing a nationwide norm
of universal adult suffrage tied closely to individual citizenship.”16
In recent years, scholars have argued that voting rights law is increasingly
turning (and should increasingly turn) toward Harper’s universalistic approach.
Professors Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes have noted that some of the most
significant voting legislation in recent years—notably the National Voter
Registration Act17 and the Help America Vote Act18—has been universal in
scope.19 Furthermore, as both Issacharoff and Pildes point out, recent waves of
constitutional voting litigation—drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bush v. Gore20 and other Supreme Court cases elaborating the right to vote—
have similarly applied a “new model” of voting rights, “one grounded on a
non-civil rights vision of fundamental guarantees” that accrue to all voters.21

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
42 U.S.C. § 1973h (2006).
See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 107-09.
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1345
(2011).
Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).
Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1665 (2002).
See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 109-110; Pildes, supra note 2, at 757.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 104; see also Pildes, supra note 2, at 759
(“[O]ne of the vastly underappreciated consequences of Bush v. Gore is its recognition that
the Constitution protects the right to vote from being arbitrarily infringed, for any reason at
all, whether or not race is involved.” (internal citation omitted)). Issacharoff and Pildes set
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Pildes argues that the “redefinition of the problem from protection of
minority voting rights to protection of voting rights as such”—as reflected in
these legal developments—“represents the future of voting rights.”22 He, and
other similarly minded scholars, tout universalistic solutions to civil rights
problems. In response to the Supreme Court’s Shelby County decision,
Issacharoff proposes that Congress adopt a regime of “smart disclosure” that
would apply to all voting changes for federal elections, and that would set the
stage for challenges to those changes if they violated any voter’s rights.23 In a
piece published while Shelby County was pending, Pildes similarly argues that
“the more effective approach is to think in terms of solutions, federal or state,
that eliminate unnecessary barriers”—such as obstacles to voter registration
and practices that cause long polling-place lines—“and protect the right to vote
in general, uniform terms.”24 Professor Hasen similarly argues for reliance on a
universalistic constitutional jurisprudence of voting rights.25
Calls for universalism have extended to many civil rights contexts beyond
voting as well. Indeed, Professor Kenji Yoshino has defended a universalistic
approach to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in general.26 He
argues that the Supreme Court has, as a result of “pluralism anxiety,” shifted
its interpretation of that amendment from emphasizing group-oriented
equality-based dignity claims to emphasizing more universal liberty-based
dignity claims. He contends that this shift is likely a positive development
because universalistic claims are more persuasive and inclusive.27
In the area of higher-education admissions, for example, commentators
have argued for a number of years that schools should abandon race-based
affirmative action and replace it with “race-neutral” efforts to achieve diversity,

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

forth their understanding of the emerging constitutional jurisprudence enforcing a universal
right to vote in Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Bush v. Gore and the Constitutional
Right to Vote, in ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE STATE OF REFORM
AFTER BUSH V. GORE (Michael Alvarez & Bernard Grofman eds., forthcoming 2014).
Pildes, supra note 2, at 760.
See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 121-23.
Richard H. Pildes, We Need a Broader Approach, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE, Feb.
24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/24/is-the-voting-rights-act-still
-needed/we-need-a-broader-approach.
See Hasen, supra note 2.
See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
Id.
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whether through something like the Texas Ten Percent Plan28 or through some
sort of class-based affirmative action.29 Whether these strategies are best
understood as “race neutral” is a matter of heated debate30—debate that will
illuminate my arguments in the remainder of this essay. But advocates of these
alternative admissions policies have certainly argued for them in universalistic
terms. The Supreme Court’s recent Fisher decision, by highlighting the Court’s
continued skepticism of explicitly race-based affirmative action, is likely to
stoke further interest in these universalistic alternatives.31
In the area of employment law as well, numerous commentators have
argued that universalistic approaches can best serve civil rights interests. In an
important recent article, Professor Katie Eyer argues that advocates should
pursue what she calls “extra-discrimination remedies” to attack discriminatory
conduct in the workplace.32 She includes just-cause termination requirements,
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and other workplace flexibility
laws, and general workplace antibullying laws as among the extradiscrimination remedies to which civil rights advocates should look.33 Along
similar lines, Professor Evan Gerstmann argues that state laws protecting all
workers against discrimination based on lawful off-duty conduct may be
superior to group-based legal protections in protecting gay and lesbian

28.

29.
30.

31.

32.
33.

See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1311-12 & n.100 (2011) (describing
conservatives’ advocacy of “percent plans” as an alternative to race-based affirmative action).
See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037
(1996) (arguing for class-based affirmative action on moral, legal, and political grounds).
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[O]nly an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral alternatives as race
unconscious.”); Brian D. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and
the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 290 (2001) (arguing that “although these
novel admissions schemes are facially race-neutral, they are no less unconstitutional than the
racial preference policies they replaced”).
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411; see John B. Judis, The Unlikely Triumph of an Affirmative Action
Prophet, NEW REPUBLIC, July 18, 2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113669/richard
-kahlenberg-class-based-affirmative-action-prophet.
Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1341 (2012).
See id. at 1345; see also Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093
(arguing that the FMLA is better suited to eradicating entrenched workplace inequality than
are Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil
Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
1443 (1996) (arguing for just-cause termination as a means of achieving civil rights ends).
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workers.34 Professor Michelle Travis cites the medical examination provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act—which protect all workers, regardless of
whether they have disabilities, against certain medical inquiries—as an example
of a universalistic approach that will help to achieve equality goals.35 In separate
works, Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman and I have advocated universalistic
workplace accommodation requirements.36 And I have argued that universal
health insurance would help eliminate “the most significant barrier to
employment for people with disabilities.”37
As the foregoing discussion suggests, universalistic approaches to civil
rights problems have had many influential advocates in recent years. The
remainder of this essay examines the arguments for and against those sorts of
approaches, before looking closely at how these arguments apply to the postShelby voting context.
ii. tactical advantages of universalist approaches
Some of the most prominent arguments for universalism have been
essentially tactical. The tactical arguments posit that universalistic approaches
are more likely to survive legal or political challenges than those that are more
targeted. I argue in this Part that these arguments are sometimes, but far from
always, true.

34.

35.
36.

37.

EVAN GERSTMANN, THE
OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL

CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE
PROTECTION 180-81 (1999). For a general discussion of off-duty
conduct laws as a protection of social equality, see Bagenstos, Employment Law, supra note 5,
at 247-53.
Michelle A. Travis, Toward Positive Equality: Taking the Disparate Impact Out of Disparate
Impact Theory, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 527, 552-59 (2012).
See BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 53-54 (arguing for a requirement that
“would demand that employers design physical and institutional structures (including work
schedules and work tasks) in a way that reasonably takes account of the largest possible
range of physical and mental abilities, and that they provide reasonable flexibility to all
potential employees whose physical or mental abilities still are not taken into account,” but
recognizing that such a radical requirement is unlikely to be adopted); Rachel ArnowRichman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary Action in
Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1108-12 (2010) (arguing for a right for
all employees to request workplace accommodations and receive a written response from
their employer).
BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 129, 145.
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A. The Tactical Argument for Universalism
When arguing in the tactical vein, advocates have urged that universalist
approaches are more durable in two realms. One realm is political—universalist
approaches, their supporters contend, can retain political support and avoid
political backlash where targeted alternatives cannot. The second realm is
judicial—judges and juries may read targeted civil rights laws narrowly, the
argument goes, but they will read and implement universalistic laws more
broadly. There is obviously some overlap between these arguments, as judges
and juries are a part of and influenced by broader political trends.38
Nevertheless, the political and judicial aspects of the tactical arguments raise
some slightly different issues, and I will address them separately.
1. Secure Political Support
Much of the advocacy of universalism is self-consciously political. Michelle
Travis argues, for example, that the “most important[]” reason for adopting
universal workplace protections is that “non-group-conscious regulation of
particular employment practices currently enjoys greater political viability than
attempts to expand the list of legally protected social identity groups.”39
Advocates of race-neutral affirmative action have often pressed similar political
arguments.40 In my own work urging universalist approaches to address
problems of disability inequality, I have looked to the history of American
social welfare policy, in which broader, universalist interventions have often
proven to be more politically popular than more narrowly targeted ones.41
Years earlier, William Julius Wilson made a similar political argument for
policies that did not focus on racial minorities but instead on “the truly

38.

39.
40.
41.

The extensive literature on political, social, and judicial backlash against the Americans with
Disabilities Act, for example, highlights the ways in which political and judicial trends
interact with and reinforce each other in this context. See, e.g., BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA:
REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003).
Travis, supra note 35, at 564.
See, e.g., Kahlenberg, supra note 29, at 1062-64.
See BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 143 (“Looking at the history of the
American welfare state in general, there seems to be a great deal of evidence to support the
notion that broad social insurance programs fare better politically than do more targeted
interventions.”). For a discussion of some of the complexities of the point as applied to the
disability context, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability and the Tension Between Citizenship
and Social Rights (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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disadvantaged” of all races.42 Relying on some of the same work in social
welfare policy, Professor Kenji Yoshino argues that a universalistic libertybased approach to equal protection can help to overcome political resistance
born of “equality fatigue” and resistance to identity politics.43 One reason for
this dynamic is that universalist interventions have a broader base of support.
Professor Mary Anne Case, for example, argues that advocating for flexible
scheduling for all workers is likely to be more politically successful than
advocating for flexible scheduling for parents alone, because the universalist
frame “would broaden the coalition for such change and potentially reduce the
possibility for zero-sum games among employees.”44
2. Ensure Broad Judicial Implementation
Sometimes, the tactical arguments for universalist interventions have
focused not on the political system generally but on predictions of how the
courts will respond. In recent years, courts have often read antidiscrimination
laws narrowly.45 This might be because judges think of them as feel-good laws
that legislators can’t publicly oppose.46 Or it might be because they think of
targeted laws as simple interest-group transfers.47 It might also stem from
what Kenji Yoshino calls “pluralism anxiety,” in which judges, like other public

42.
43.
44.

45.

46.

47.

See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 118 (1987).
See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 794-95.
Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and
How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 1768
(2001).
For an influential discussion, see generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination
Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002). I highlighted the problem of courts’ narrow readings of
the ADA in BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 46-47.
Justice Scalia’s description of Voting Rights Act preclearance as a “racial entitlement” in
the Shelby County argument seems to rest on this sort of view. See Amy Davidson, In
Voting Rights, Scalia Sees a “Racial Entitlement,” NEW YORKER, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/02/in-voting-rights-scalia-sees-a
-racial-entitlement.html (quoting Justice Scalia: “Even the name of it is wonderful: the
Voting Rights Act. Who is going to vote against that in the future?”).
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-18 (1984) (arguing that courts should interpret
interest-group legislation narrowly); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471 (1989) (arguing “that courts should narrowly construe
statutes that embody mere interest-group deals”).
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actors, fear that targeted civil rights laws divide us into different group-based
“fiefs.”48 In equal protection cases, this skepticism is reinforced by, or perhaps
instantiated in, the constitutional law doctrines that impose strict scrutiny on
even “benign” racial discrimination.49 Influential judges—and Justices—have
recently suggested that various antidiscrimination laws, notably those that
prohibit practices with unjustified disparate impacts, might trigger, and fail,
strict scrutiny, and they have cited that concern as a reason for reading those
statutes narrowly.50 The increasing conservatism of the courts makes all of
these responses increasingly likely.51
Alternatively, courts’ narrow readings of antidiscrimination laws may stem
from their narrow understandings of what constitutes “discrimination.”
Extensively reviewing the psychological literature, Professor Katie Eyer shows
that people consistently think of discrimination as something that involves
individual fault and discriminatory intent on the part of the perpetrator—and
that they are often unwilling to attribute negative outcomes to discrimination
even in the presence of strong evidence of such fault and intent.52 She
persuasively argues that the restrictive interpretation of civil rights laws reflects
judges’ and jurors’ adoption of this narrow psychological frame for
understanding discrimination.53 When a person injured by an employer’s
conduct labels that conduct “discrimination,” for example, she may trigger
defensiveness on the part of the employer54—a defensiveness that judges and
jurors, who tend to believe that discrimination is rare, will likely indulge and
share. In my own work expressing skepticism about structural approaches to
antidiscrimination law, I have similarly argued that judges are hostile to efforts

48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

Yoshino, supra note 26, at 747-48.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594-97 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Dahlia Lithwick, The Courts: The Conservative Takeover Will Be Complete, WASH.
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2012 (“[T]he one legacy of which George W. Bush can be most proud
is his fundamental transformation of the lower federal judiciary—a change that happened
almost undetected by the left.”).
See Eyer, supra note 32, at 1292-1318.
See id. at 1318-1327.
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in
Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009).
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to expand civil rights law beyond “the paradigm of a fault-based understanding
of ‘discrimination.’”55
Universalist approaches may avoid these problems. “Because the operative
issue” under a universalist workplace protection regime “is not whether a
particular individual has been discriminated against—but rather whether the
set of facts presented can fulfill a distinct (and typically more straightforward)
set of statutory or judicial requirements,” Eyer argues that a judge or jury
therefore need not resolve “the difficult and psychologically contingent
question of whether discrimination truly took place.”56 She contends that a
move toward universalistic approaches (which she calls “extra-discrimination
remedies”) is likely to make a significant, positive difference in the ability of
discrimination victims to vindicate their claims in court.57 In the disability
context specifically, I have argued that a universal requirement of workplace
accommodation—not limited to people with disabilities—can help prevent
judges from “see[ing] their job as vigorously policing the line between those
who are in and those who are out of the protected class.”58
B. Problems with the Tactical Argument
These tactical arguments are powerful. But there is reason to believe that
universalist approaches to civil rights laws will often have the opposite tactical
effect—that they will undermine political and judicial support for their
enforcement. Moreover, the tactical arguments for universalist approaches rest
on a questionable empirical premise—that actors in the political and judicial
systems will understand those approaches as protecting everyone instead of as
benefitting particular groups. To the extent this premise does not hold,
universalist approaches to civil rights problems are unlikely to realize their
supposed tactical advantages. This Section addresses those possibilities.59

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Structural Turn].
Eyer, supra note 32, at 1346.
Id.
BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 46.
Of course, not all of these arguments are consistent with each other. Many are in fact in
tension. But that underscores my fundamental point in this essay: that the choice between
universalism and targeting cannot be made in the abstract but only on the basis of a careful
examination of the context at issue.
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1. Undermine Political Support and Dilute Judicial Willingness to Enforce
Compassion fatigue may limit the utility of a universalist response to civil
rights problems. Many tactical critiques of universalism rest on the premise
that there is “a small, fixed quantity of goodwill for civil rights causes.”60 If
that premise holds, extending protections beyond the most compelling cases
may undermine political support for those protections. Professor Jessica
Clarke, for example, argues powerfully that universal workplace bullying laws
will trivialize the cause of ending sexual harassment by lumping those who
experience sexual harassment with those who are making a federal case out of
something that sounds like relatively minor, childish behavior.61 Clarke
similarly argues that laws guaranteeing workplace flexibility for all employees
will undermine support for accommodations for workers who take care of
family members, because such laws will tie those accommodations to the most
trivial reasons an employee might have for wanting to be away from work.62
The erosion of support might occur in legislatures, where representatives could
be less willing to push for broader universalist laws than for narrower targeted
ones. Or the erosion might occur in the judiciary, where overworked judges
could look for excuses to knock cases brought under these broader laws out
of court.
The implicit premise in Clarke’s argument is important—the “civil rights”
label has a powerful cachet in American politics.63 If political and judicial actors
believe that an intervention is really a civil rights law, they are willing to accept
that it should override their baseline preference against regulation of
businesses and state and local governments.64 But they continue to have a

60.

61.
62.
63.

64.

Julie C. Suk, Race Without Cards?, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 111, 114 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD
THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS
WORSE (2008)).
Clarke, supra note 10, at 1263-66.
Id. at 1278-79.
For a recent effort to harness the political power of the civil rights label to obtain support for
collective bargaining rights, see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & MOSHE Z. MARVIT, WHY LABOR
ORGANIZING SHOULD BE A CIVIL RIGHT (2012).
This is at least part of the thought behind Justice Scalia’s labeling of Voting Rights Act
preclearance as a “racial entitlement.” See Davidson, supra note 46. Note also the arguments
of many disability rights supporters, in the wake of courts’ initial narrow readings of the
ADA, that judges failed to understand that the statute was really a civil rights law. See, e.g.,
Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000).
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narrow understanding of what kinds of interventions deserve the civil rights
label. And universalist approaches, which extend beyond protecting the
particular groups or axes of identity that seem to raise the most pressing claims
of justice, will push common understandings of civil rights beyond most
people’s limits.65 As a result, those approaches will lose the support that comes
with the civil rights label and may be unable to overcome political and judicial
resistance to regulating businesses and state and local governments.
Housing and Urban Development Secretary George Romney’s efforts to
pursue economic integration of the suburbs, discussed in Professor Ackerman’s
chapter on “The Breakthrough of 1968,” provide an excellent example of this
dynamic. As Professor Ackerman notes, “Romney wanted to force the suburbs
to open their doors to subsidized housing for poor people of all races,” because
“[e]conomic, not merely racial, integration was his goal.”66 Romney’s efforts,
which marked a universalizing step beyond prohibiting race discrimination in
housing, provoked a massive backlash.67 When President Nixon gave in to the
backlash (one with which he agreed68), he retreated to a position that, at least
on its face, supported strong enforcement of the Fair Housing Act’s
prohibitions on race discrimination.69
Relatedly, the political process has proven to be particularly responsive to
some groups of beneficiaries of civil rights laws. People with disabilities, for
example, have often proven able to mobilize targeted legislation on their
behalf.70 And there are more general reasons why targeted laws may draw more
political support than universalist approaches do. For one thing, powerful
currents in public choice theory generally predict that laws with narrowly
targeted beneficiaries and broadly distributed costs are likely to be highly

65.
66.
67.

68.
69.
70.

See FORD, supra note 60, at 176.
3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 218-19.
Troublingly for both sides of the universalism debate, they provoked a backlash largely
because they were understood as mainly benefiting racial minorities, and indeed as being
the most effective means of achieving racial integration in housing. See CHRISTOPHER
BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO
DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 103, 105-07 (2006). I will return to this point.
See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 222-23.
See id. For some well-taken doubts as to how strong Nixon’s support of the antidiscrimination principle was in this context, see BONASTIA, supra note 67, at 109-10.
See BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 144; see also Jonathan Zasloff, Children,
Families, and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225, 308 n.259 (1998)
(arguing that disability welfare programs have fared well politically because their
beneficiaries have “substantial political support among the general public”).
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politically resilient.71 For another, targeted laws will often achieve their goals
more efficiently than universalist approaches, and the political process may
reward this efficiency.72
The political case for universalism is therefore more complicated than the
advocates suggest. In many circumstances, universalist approaches to civil
rights problems are likely to be less politically and judicially resilient than are
targeted approaches.
2. Become Coded as Serving a Particular Group
There is a second major problem with the political argument for
universalism. That argument assumes that a universalist approach will avoid
the backlash that often accompanies legislation designed to advance the
interests of a particular, perhaps stigmatized, group. But it is far from obvious
that the social and political understanding of a law will so closely track its legal
form. To the contrary, even a universalist law that is motivated by a desire to
serve a particular group may soon be understood as essentially targeting that
group.
Many of the critiques of class-based affirmative action make a form of this
argument. Professor Richard Fallon, for example, suggests that “economically
based affirmative action” programs may, “once in operation, . . . generate
significant division and resentment, especially if they [a]re broad in scope.”73
Professor Randy Kennedy argues, even more sharply, that “[t]he day after
affirmative action is ended, right-wingers who were previously singing the
praises of race-neutral alternatives will all of a sudden begin perceiving that
these alternatives also ‘victimize’ whites, deviate from meritocratic standards,
and so on and so forth.”74 George Romney’s efforts to impose economic

71.
72.
73.

74.

See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). This notion, too,
seems to be part of the inspiration behind Justice Scalia’s “racial entitlement” comment.
This is the basic political argument of PETER H. SCHUCK & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER,
TARGETING IN SOCIAL PROGRAMS: AVOIDING BAD BETS, REMOVING BAD APPLES (2006).
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1913, 1939 (1996). Note also Professor Wilson’s argument that the Great Society’s reliance
on means-tested anti-poverty programs associated the Great Society with minorities and
made it politically vulnerable. See WILSON, supra note 42, at 125-39.
Randall Kennedy, Affirmative Reaction, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 19, 2003, http://prospect.org
/article/affirmative-reaction; see also RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW 177-79 (2013) (giving examples of prominent
affirmative action opponents who have argued that percentage admissions plans are
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integration on the suburbs provide an example here—they provoked a backlash
precisely because racial minorities were understood as their principal
beneficiaries. In a different context, I have argued that even when disability
activists pursue universalistic solutions to their civil rights problems, they are
likely, “by their very participation,” to lead the public to associate those
solutions with people with disabilities particularly.75
A number of commentators have identified examples of this dynamic in
work/life policies. As Clarke shows, “in many workplaces, even universally
available flexible work arrangements and leave policies are regarded as special
accommodations for caretakers or ‘mommy tracks.’”76 As a result, laws
requiring universal workplace accommodations—like the FMLA—may
encourage discrimination by employers, and may feed public stereotypes that
women are and should be the principal caregivers in society.77
* * *
As a simple tactical matter, then, the effects of a universalistic approach to
civil rights are ambiguous. In some settings at some times—notably where
targeted approaches are highly contentious and the universalist alternatives are
relatively non-burdensome and are not understood by political and judicial
actors as simply replacing targeted measures—universalist approaches are
likely to be more tactically effective than targeted ones. But in others—notably
where universalist approaches impose significant burdens on regulated entities
or are politically understood as really being aimed at achieving targeted goals—
they will be less so.

75.
76.
77.

unconstitutional on the same grounds). For a careful if now somewhat dated exploration of
this issue from a constitutional perspective, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional
Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331 (2000).
BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 145.
Clarke, supra note 10, at 1271.
See Michael Selmi, Is Something Better Than Nothing? Critical Reflections on Ten Years of the
FMLA, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65, 67 (2004) (arguing that to the extent that the FMLA
“has had any effect at all on” gender stereotypes or discrimination against women in the
workplace, “the statute has likely exacerbated both, though probably only to a socially
insignificant degree”); see also Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223,
290-300 (2000) (arguing that the FMLA likely has a negative effect on the wages of female
workers, because employers can predict that women are more likely to take FMLA leave).
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iii. substantive advantages of universalist approaches
Not all of the arguments for universalist approaches to civil rights are
purely tactical. Others are substantive. Defenders of universalism argue that
universalist approaches do a better job of promoting equality and dignity—not
just because they are more likely to be adopted and enforced than targeted
approaches, but also because they are more effective policy tools for solving
civil rights problems. But this set of arguments, like the tactical arguments
addressed in the previous Part, holds only sometimes. Other times, universalist
approaches may actually undermine substantive civil rights goals.
A. The Substantive Argument for Universalism
Universalist approaches might be substantively superior to targeted ones in
two respects: first, they might help to overcome limitations in the reach or
enforcement of targeted civil rights laws that would otherwise allow groupbased discrimination to escape sanction; second, they might protect interests in
citizenship or dignity that are threatened by conduct that is neither groupbased nor discriminatory but that nonetheless deserve protection.
1. More Effectively Address Discrimination
For a variety of reasons, group-based antidiscrimination laws will
predictably fail to eliminate discrimination and group-based inequality. For
example, the existence of persistent racially polarized voting makes it difficult
as a practical matter to disentangle racial motivations for election-law changes
from partisan or political motivations for those changes.78 As a result, many
voting restrictions that are in fact motivated by race will predictably escape
liability under a law that prohibits voting discrimination, because it will be
difficult for a plaintiff to prove that race, rather than politics, was the true
motivation.79 In the workplace context, the widespread persistence of the

78.

79.

See Hasen, supra note 2, at 60; Pildes, supra note 2, at 761. For an example of some of the
difficulties of disentangling racial and political motivations in this context, see Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243-58 (2001).
Thus, in the litigation challenging voting restrictions implemented in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s Shelby County decision, both Texas and North Carolina have defended
their restrictive laws on the ground that they targeted Democrats, not minorities—even
though minorities consistently and overwhelmingly support Democrats in those states. See
Hasen, supra note 2.
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baseline rule of employment-at-will similarly hides intentional discrimination
by “facilitat[ing] employers’ assertion of pretextual reasons for termination.”80
Indeed, the difficulty in proving intentional discrimination exists throughout
civil rights law. Congress has frequently responded by prohibiting actions that
have an unjustified disparate impact on protected groups.81 But plaintiffs face
significant hurdles in proving disparate impact as well.82
A universalistic approach could overcome these problems by uniformly
prohibiting certain actions that are often discriminatory without requiring
proof of discrimination in any individual case. A statute might prohibit
changes from district-by-district to at-large elections, for example, or it might
prohibit restrictive voter identification laws. In the employment context, a
statute might prohibit employers from terminating any employee without good
cause. Classic examples of prophylaxis, laws like these would sweep more
broadly than simply prohibiting discrimination, but they would do so in order
to ensure that discrimination did not escape sanction.
Universalist approaches can also help to overcome a distinct limitation of
antidiscrimination laws. Antidiscrimination laws focus on identifying unequal
treatment by bad actors, but they do so against a taken-for-granted baseline of
social and institutional structures. Those structures may themselves limit the
opportunities of members of certain groups, whether by limiting access to
material goods that are necessary for opportunity or by constructing identities
in a way that reinforces limiting stereotypes.83 Professor Catherine Albiston,
for example, argues that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act fails to achieve
gender equality because it takes for granted workplace time standards that
embody unequal cultural conceptions of gender and work.84 Universal worklife protections like the FMLA, she argues, can attack these gender inequalities
at a deeper, institutional level.85 Similarly, I have argued that the ADA’s
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Bagenstos, Employment Law, supra note 5, at 245; see Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge
Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1995); Joseph E. Slater, The “American
Rule” That Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53 (2007).
See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept
of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006).
See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 55, at 13-14, 21-24; Michael Selmi, Was the
Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 734-53 (2006).
I have emphasized the limits of antidiscrimination law in overcoming deep-rooted structural
inequalities in Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Bagenstos, Future of Disability]; and Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 55.
See Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1128-55.
See id. at 1155-65.
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employment title will fail to achieve disability equality because it takes for
granted our health insurance system, which represents the largest barrier to
workforce participation for a large class of individuals with disabilities.86
Universal health insurance, by contrast, can attack the problem of disability
inequality on a deeper, structural level.87 And as Professor Ackerman shows in
his discussion of George Romney’s open housing initiatives, laws prohibiting
race discrimination in housing can create opportunities for minority-group
members who are rich enough to afford to buy houses in suburban
communities, but those laws are of far less utility in combating the economic
disadvantage that keeps many minorities from being able to afford such houses
in the first place.88
2. Address Broader but Important Problems of Inequality and Injustice
The first set of substantive arguments suggested that universalist
approaches can do a better job than targeted ones of identifying and uprooting
the group-based discrimination that is the target of most civil rights laws. But
advocates have offered a more far-reaching substantive justification for
universalist approaches. Those approaches, they argue, can address problems
of inequality and injustice that go well beyond the sorts of group-based
discrimination that civil rights laws generally target.
Some of these advocates argue that universalist approaches can
appropriately focus the law on group-based disadvantages that are broader
than, or even orthogonal to, the group-based disadvantages on which civil
rights laws tend to focus. Supporters of class-based affirmative action, for
example, argue that poverty is a more important barrier to social mobility than
race, and that race-based affirmative action provides the most benefit to those
racial minorities who already have the most advantages.89 Before his
appointment to the bench, Clarence Thomas thus argued that “[a]ny
preferences given should be directly related to the burdens that have been
unfairly placed in those individuals’ paths, rather than on the basis of race or
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See Bagenstos, Future of Disability, supra note 83, at 26-34.
See id. at 74.
See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 326.
See Kahlenberg, supra note 29, at 1060 (arguing that, for this reason, class-based affirmative
action “does a better job of providing equal opportunity than . . . the current system of
affirmative action”); see also WILSON, supra note 42.
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gender, or on other characteristics that are often poor proxies for true
disadvantage.”90
Other advocates argue that universalist approaches are superior because
they vindicate rights or interests that everyone shares. For example, Professor
Issacharoff and others argue that universalist protections of the right to vote
are preferable to bans on voting discrimination because everyone has an
interest in voting—one that is not fully protected by an antidiscrimination
law.91 In the workplace context, I have advocated universalist protections on
the ground that they can protect each worker’s interest in being treated as a
social equal with his or her boss.92 Others have advocated particular
universalist workplace protections on the ground that they protect each
worker’s privacy or dignity.93 A targeted antidiscrimination law cannot achieve
these goals as effectively, because it provides no effective tools to respond to
cases in which all workers are denied treatment that vindicates their interests in
social equality, privacy, and dignity.
B. Problems with the Substantive Argument
Notwithstanding these potential substantive advantages of universalist
approaches to civil rights problems, the breadth of those approaches can
undermine civil rights goals as well. Framing the law in broad, universalistic
terms can dilute the protections enjoyed by the groups that were the original
intended beneficiaries of antidiscrimination laws. Even worse, universalist
approaches will often address broader problems of inequality and injustice only
by taking for granted, and indeed entrenching, pre-existing group-based
inequalities.
For those who believe that a broad, universalist approach to issues of
inequality can best address the problems of group-based inequality that are the
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Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough, 5
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 410-11 (1987).
See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 113 (“Election officials are entrusted
with administration of a system fraught with the potential for ends-oriented misbehavior,
whether predicated on race, partisanship, personal gain, political favoritism, or outright
corruption.”); Jonathan Soros & Mark Schmitt, The Missing Right: A Constitutional Right to
Vote, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2013, at 22 (arguing for a universalist right-to-vote amendment to
the Constitution).
See Bagenstos, Employment Law, supra note 5.
See, e.g., David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year
Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251 (2010).
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principal focus of targeted civil rights laws, the New Deal should offer a
cautionary lesson. As described in great detail, most recently by Ira Katznelson,
the social and economic legislation of the New Deal, while broadly
redistributive, was designed in a way that minimized its challenges to the racial
caste system that existed in the American South.94 New Deal programs also
took for granted a gendered division of labor, in which men were understood
as the primary wage-earners, and women, if they worked at all, were consigned
to subordinated jobs.95 By granting protections to workers in predominantly
white and male jobs, while denying them to workers in job classifications
dominated by minorities and women, many of these programs entrenched race
and gender inequality at the same time as they alleviated economic inequality
—even when they did not on their face discriminate based on race or gender.
Current proposals for class-based affirmative action may have similar
substantive limitations. They may alleviate economic inequality but do very
little to promote racial equality.96 And, as Professor Deborah Malamud argues,
policymakers’ understandings of class may fail to appreciate race and sex
dynamics in the transmission of wealth. Professor Malamud cites “ample
evidence that the interactions among economic factors differ for men and
women, that women are less able than men to take personal advantage of
inherited and earned economic and social capital, and that occupational
schemes developed for men are less accurate for women.”97 She also notes that
“the past and present effects of discrimination mean that blacks and whites
who appear to have the same occupation, education, or residential situation
when a simple metric is used may well not occupy the same status in reality.”98
An admissions program that looks simply to generic socioeconomic data will
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See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013);
see also ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE (1998); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor
Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987). Federal
programs supporting homeownership infamously promoted racial segregation in housing
during this period. See BONASTIA, supra note 67, at 61-65.
See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001); SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING
CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998).
See Fallon, supra note 73, at 1947-49 (noting that most beneficiaries of class-based
affirmative action are likely to be white).
Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1847, 1891 (1996).
Id. at 1892.
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categorize many women and minorities as being less “disadvantaged” than they
actually are. It may also give preferences to at least some less “disadvantaged”
men and whites over more “disadvantaged” women and minorities. As a result,
class-based affirmative action may actually further entrench race and sex
inequality.99
Professor Jessica Clarke makes a similar argument against universalist
protections of work/life balance. She contends that because of society’s
gendered division of labor, women will often use these protections to take time
off work to take care of family, while men will often use them to make
themselves better workers (by, for example, taking classes to improve their
work-related skills). If so, the protections will reinforce, rather than
undermine, pre-existing gender inequalities.100 Moreover, Clarke argues, preexisting stereotypes may affect not just the way beneficiaries use universalist
protections, but also the way regulated entities and courts apply those
protections. In the work/life context, she contends, employers deciding what
accommodations to grant—and courts deciding what accommodations to
require—will often fall back on (gendered) stereotypes about what are
sufficiently important reasons to miss work.101 A recent experimental study of
managers’ responses to workplace flexibility requests lends additional credence
to these concerns. That study found that “managers were most likely to grant
flextime to high-status men seeking flexible schedules in order to advance their
careers,” while “flexible scheduling requests from women were unlikely to be
granted irrespective of their job status or reason.”102
More generally, as Professor Yoshino argues, universalism may “paper[]
over the subordination in need of . . . correction.”103 Yoshino gives the example
of universalist arguments for reproductive autonomy—an argumentative frame
that, in his words, “elides the real biological differences between men and
women that make the exercise of this right completely different for the two
sexes.”104 In a different context, Professor Elizabeth Emens suggests that
universalist requirements for workplace accommodations might fail to take
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See id. at 1890-94.
See Clarke, supra note 10, at 1274-78.
Id. at 1269-70.
Victoria L. Brescoll, Jennifer Glass & Alexandra Sedlovskaya, Ask and Ye Shall Receive? The
Dynamics of Employer-Provided Flexible Work Options and the Need for Public Policy, 69 J. SOC.
ISSUES 367, 367 (2013).
Yoshino, supra note 26, at 798.
Id.
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account of “disabled people and their particular needs.”105 Professor Catherine
MacKinnon similarly argues that universalist protections against workplace
harassment fail to take account of the unique harms of sex-based harassment
against women.106 Taking this point a step further, Clarke argues that such
protections—often framed these days as prohibitions of workplace
“bullying”—may actually harm women. Employers and courts will view the
concept through the lens of gender stereotypes, she contends, and they may
find aggressive behavior by women to be bullying in circumstances in which
they would find equally aggressive behavior by men to be normal and
acceptable.107
The issue here is not just that universalistic approaches may be poorly
designed—a problem that technocratic tinkering would resolve. The issue is a
mismatch between universalist solutions and the problem of racial or other
group-based subordination. Since universalists argue that their preferred
policies will solve problems that are broader than and different from those
solved by targeted policies, it should be no surprise that universalist solutions
will not always do as well at solving the problems for which targeted policies
are designed.
* * *
As with the tactical arguments for universalism, the substantive arguments
are ambiguous. In some circumstances, universalist approaches will be
substantively better—notably where group-based discrimination is hard to
prove, or where the problem is not just discrimination but the deeper, takenfor-granted structural background. But in others—where they dilute
protections enjoyed by the beneficiaries of targeted laws, or where they
entrench existing group-based inequalities—they will undermine civil rights
goals.
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Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 894 (2008).
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
DISCRIMINATION 88 (1979).
See Clarke, supra note 10, at 1253-54.
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iv. expressive advantages of universalist approaches
A final category of arguments for universalism is expressive. Many
advocates defend universalist approaches based on the messages they send.108
But here, too, the takeaway is ambiguous.
A. The Expressive Argument for Universalism
Targeted civil rights laws, the expressive argument goes, depend on and
feed essentializing stereotypes about the characteristics of members of
particular groups. Professor Albiston’s case for the superiority of the FMLA
provides an example of this sort of argument. As I noted earlier, Albiston
contends that Title VII’s reach is unduly limited because it takes for granted
work practices (regarding the availability of part-time work or sick leave, for
example) that may themselves be deeply infused with, and indeed constitutive
of, gender roles.109 Because the statute “tends to focus only on the gender side
of the equation without interrogating work practices,” she argues, “it invites
courts to locate barriers to working in the personal circumstances and choices
of women, and not in the structure of work itself.”110 By so doing, it “reinforces
institutionalized work practices that push workers, both men and women, to
adopt traditional gender roles at home.”111 In the end, the “process of defining
what gender and work mean for purposes of legal analysis tends to solidify and
naturalize existing conceptions of these categories, and the relationship
between them, in ways that undermine social change.”112 She contends that a
universal workplace flexibility law, like the FMLA, can help solve these
problems:
When the focus shifts away from who is protected by
antidiscrimination statutes to what work should look like, the question
is not whether women should get special treatment even though they
cannot live up to deeply entrenched time norms in the workplace. The
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For a generally supportive treatment of the expressive value of law, see Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1503 (2000).
See Albiston, supra note 84, at 1155.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1155-56.
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question becomes whether the institution of work itself should be
restructured by law, and along with it both the workplace and the nonworkplace ways of organizing social life around traditional gendered
roles.113
Relatedly, I have argued that targeted disability protections may entrench the
public view that “people with disabilities are not capable of providing for
themselves.”114 And Yoshino has defended a universal liberty-based approach
to the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis that “it is less likely to essentialize
identity” than is a targeted equality-based approach.115
Advocates of universalist approaches also make a distinct expressive
argument. They contend that targeted approaches to civil rights problems are
divisive. Targeted approaches, they argue, send a Balkanizing message that we
should think of ourselves as defined by our membership in particular, socially
salient groups. Universalist approaches, by contrast, “stress[] the interests we
have in common as human beings rather than the demographic differences that
drive us apart.”116 They can, advocates contend, help to build social solidarity
across group lines.117
B. Problems with the Expressive Argument
The essential problem with the expressive argument for universalism is
that it rests on the premise that the message expressed by a law turns on its
legal form. The argument seems to run that if a law specifically treats people
differently based on their group status, or requires judges, administrators, or
regulated entities applying the law to consider individuals’ group status, then it
will send the message that group status matters, but if a law is not specifically
framed in group-based or targeted terms, then it will not send such a
message.118 That argument is plausible, but it is just as plausible that many
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Id. at 1156-57.
BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 144.
Yoshino, supra note 26, at 795.
Id. at 793.
See Kahlenberg, supra note 29, at 1063-64 (arguing that class-based affirmative action can
bring people together across racial lines).
Justice Kennedy’s recent race jurisprudence seems to rest on such a premise. See Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788-89 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Siegel, supra note 28.
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laws will have a social meaning that does not turn on such formalities. Indeed,
the basic argument of the leading scholarly work on race and the social
meaning of law is that social meaning does not turn on legal form—or even the
intent of those who enacted the law at issue.119
Table 1.

summary of arguments
Arguments for
Universalism

Tactical

 Secure political support

 Undermine political support

 Ensure broad judicial

 Dilute judicial willingness to

implementation

 More effectively address

discrimination
Substantive

 Address broader problems

of injustice
 Undermine essentializing

Expressive

Arguments Against
Universalism

stereotypes
 Send a message of
community unity

enforce
 Become coded as serving a
particular group
 Dilute protections enjoyed by

original beneficiaries
 Take for granted/entrench pre-

existing group-based
inequalities
 Still reflect and transmit group-

oriented stereotypes

As I have noted in the previous two Parts, even universalist civil rights
laws are likely to reflect and transmit pervasive group-oriented stereotypes.
This might happen because the public understands universalist approaches as
really focusing their benefits on particular groups (I argued, for example, that
the public may well understand class-based affirmative action as another

119.

See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323-26 (1987) (arguing that a test focused on intent fails to
capture important elements of racism and racial impact).
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program that protects racial minorities, albeit one that does so through indirect
means). Alternatively, it might happen because the application and
enforcement of a universalist law reflects essentializing stereotypes. Consider,
in this regard, Jessica Clarke’s argument that universalist workplace flexibility
laws will merely become a vehicle through which workers, employers, and
courts implement their views of proper gender roles. If dynamics like this exist,
universalist approaches are as likely as targeted ones to send divisive and
essentializing messages.
v. notes on voting rights after shelby county
The preceding analysis has operated at a very high level of generality. Is it
helpful in analyzing the actual problems of civil rights law? I believe it is.
Advocates of universalist approaches to civil rights law often conflate the
tactical, substantive, and expressive arguments for universalism. It is only by
disentangling these threads and carefully examining how they apply to a
particular context that we can determine whether a universalist approach in
that context makes sense. In this Part, I illustrate the point by discussing the
recent proposals for a universalist approach to voting rights. I argue that such
an approach will not address key problems to which voting rights policy
should respond.
A. Unpacking the Post-Shelby Universalist Proposals
After the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a key part of the Voting
Rights Act preclearance regime in Shelby County v. Holder,120 a number of
prominent commentators urged that Congress and civil rights advocates
respond with a universalist approach. Professor Samuel Issacharoff, for
example, argues for a regime of “smart disclosure,” in which states that change
procedures relating to federal elections must file “voting impact statements,”
signed by the chief election official and available on the internet.121 He frames

120.
121.

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 121-22. Spencer Overton argues that
increased disclosure is necessary but not sufficient as a response to Shelby County. See
Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2013). Before the Court’s
decision in Shelby County, Guy Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer argued for a “contingency
strategy” that relies on institutional intermediaries to obtain and disseminate information
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his proposal as one “designed to facilitate” litigation under what he calls the
“new Equal Protection Jurisprudence”122 stemming from Bush v. Gore.123
Issacharoff describes that jurisprudence, which is not focused on race, as
“responding to the more overt manipulations of the ballot for partisan ends,
and based on a novel form of intermediate scrutiny that tests in a serious way a
legislature’s actual justifications for new regulations of the voting process.”124
Richard Hasen similarly argues that courts assessing voting restrictions should
adopt a “strict scrutiny light” standard:
When a legislature passes an election-administration law . . .
discriminating against a party’s voters or otherwise burdening voters,
. . . courts should read the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause to require the legislature to produce substantial evidence that it
has a good reason for burdening voters and that its means are closely
connected to achieving those ends.125
Even before the Shelby County decision (though plainly anticipating it),
Richard Pildes argued that federal voting legislation, rather than aiming
primarily at race discrimination, should focus “on defining the appropriate
baseline of proper election practices—precisely as [the Help America Vote Act]
does with respect to provisional ballots and the [National Voter Registration
Act] does with respect to voter registration.”126
How should we assess these calls for universalist approaches to voting
rights? The first thing to do is to unpack the arguments that their proponents
offer in support of them. These arguments have blended together tactical and
substantive considerations. To be sure, their major rhetorical thrust has been
substantive. Thus, Professor Issacharoff argues that the Voting Rights Act
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123.
124.
125.
126.

about voting changes. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a PostShelby County Contingency Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131 (2013), http://
yalelawjournal.org/forum/mapping-a-post-shelby-county-contingency-strategy. For an
influential pre-Shelby County argument for disclosure, see Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way
for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 724
(2006).
Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 103, 123.
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 107.
Hasen, supra note 2, at 62.
Pildes, supra note 2, at 756.
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model is a poor fit with what he calls “the voting problems of today.”127 In this,
he echoes Professor Pildes’s argument that a universalist model “better fits the
voting-rights problems of today.”128 So what are the voting problems of today?
To Professor Issacharoff, they are largely questions of access to the ballot,
implicated by state laws imposing voter identification requirements and
restrictions on early voting.129 He acknowledges that such restrictions likely
have “a disparate racial impact,” but argues that the racial impact is “likely the
means rather than the end”—the end being partisan or incumbent
entrenchment.130 The fundamental substantive issue in the voting context, he
suggests, is not race but the “conflict of interest” that exists when elections are
run by partisan officials who are the co-partisans of, or at times the very same
individuals as, “those who stand to benefit from the rules they create or
enforce.”131 Professor Issacharoff’s call to move “beyond the discrimination
model” aims at this general problem of conflict of interest, whether
instantiated in race discrimination or other forms of entrenchment. Thus,
Professor Issacharoff relies on the “address-broader-problems-of-injustice”
variant of the substantive argument for universalism.
Professor Hasen takes much the same position, though he also emphasizes
the “more-effectively-address-discrimination” variant of the substantive
argument. He pitches his proposal for “strict scrutiny light” in all cases
involving election restrictions as one that will attack race discrimination as part
of combatting a broader problem. “[T]his new rule,” he argues, “will inhibit
discrimination on the basis of both race and party, and protect all voters from
unnecessary burdens on the right to vote.”132
But there is an undeniable tactical undercurrent to these proposals as well.
Thus, Professor Issacharoff notes that “[o]ne reading” of Shelby County is “that
the race discrimination structure of section 5 could not be justified in light of

127.

128.
129.
130.
131.
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Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 96; see also id. at 104 (“In terms of crafting
a post-Shelby County regime of legal protection of the right to vote, the question for today is
how much of the terrain the civil rights model still captures.”); id. at 120 (asserting an
“increasing mismatch between the narrow civil rights model and the nature of
contemporary threats to the right to vote”).
Pildes, supra note 2, at 744.
See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 103; see also Pildes, supra note 2, at 75052 (discussing contemporary obstacles to voting).
Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 103.
Id. at 113-14.
Hasen, supra note 2, at 62.
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the increasing distance between the prohibitions and the distinct practices of
racial exclusion that lie at the heart of the Voting Rights Act.”133 He contrasts
the Court’s skepticism of the civil rights model with its expansive
interpretation of Congress’s Elections Clause authority in Arizona v. InterTribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,134 as well as with the Sixth Circuit’s creation of
“a new constitutional jurisprudence” of voting protections derived from Bush v.
Gore.135 It is not hard to detect the suggestion that the more universalistic
approaches represented by Elections Clause legislation and Bush v. Gore
litigation are more likely to gain traction with the courts than beefing up the
civil rights model is.
For his part, Professor Hasen is explicit that he believes that challenges to
voting restrictions under antidiscrimination laws are unlikely to be successful
with the current federal courts.136 Although he recognizes that some may
believe his universalist approach “does not give race enough of an explicit role,”
Professor Hasen defends it on tactical grounds: “[I]t is unrealistic,” he says “to
expect the current Supreme Court to endorse laws policing subtle
discrimination in voting. The stronger claim before this Supreme Court is to
protect the voting process from partisan manipulation.”137 Professor Issacharoff
and Professor Hasen thus both rely on the “ensure-judicial-willingness-toenforce” variant of the tactical argument for universalism.
I may be reading too much into these arguments, but I also perceive an
important expressive undertone to them. Because the right to vote is at the core
of modern notions of citizenship, perhaps universalist rules governing voting
are especially important because they express a notion of equal citizenship in a
way that more particularized rules as applied to other spheres (education,
employment, and so forth) might not.138 The promotion of universalism in
voting might therefore connect with a broader skepticism about the expressive
effects of certain particularistic approaches to voting rights—notably the use of
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Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 117.
133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 107.
See Hasen, supra note 2, at 66-67.
Id. at 73.
For the classic argument that different principles of distribution might apply to different
spheres of social activity, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
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the Voting Rights Act to encourage the creation of majority-minority districts
that subordinated other redistricting principles to race.139
B. Critiquing the Post-Shelby Universalist Proposals
Let’s examine each of these arguments in turn. First, do universal
approaches effectively attack the voting problems of today? As I argued above,
a major critique of the substantive argument for universalism is that
universalist approaches may divert attention from persistent problems of
discrimination and thereby leave those problems in place. That critique seems
fully applicable to the post-Shelby proposals for voting rights universalism.
Those proposals focus on the problem of vote denial—restrictions on the
opportunity to register to vote or cast a ballot.140 There is no doubt that vote
denial is a major problem, and a number of formerly covered states adopted
laws restricting registration and voting in the immediate aftermath of Shelby
that raised serious concerns about discrimination.141 A universalistic approach
that effectively attacked burdensome identification laws and limits on early
voting would serve civil rights interests.142
But such a law would also leave a lot of significant discrimination against
black and Latino voters unremedied. That is because a great deal of that
discrimination involves vote dilution, not vote denial, and it takes place at the
county and local, not state, level.143 Indeed, the overwhelming majority of
section 5 objections since 2000—86.4%—involved localities rather than
states.144 In the wake of Shelby County, a number of formerly covered localities
have acted quickly to take actions (altering electoral districts, moving from

139.

140.
141.

142.
143.
144.

For a discussion of the expressive harms of such redistricting, see Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993).
See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006).
For a good roundup of laws passed in the immediate aftermath of Shelby County, see Kara
Brandeisky & Mike Tigas, Everything That’s Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on Voting
Rights Act, PROPUBLICA, Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/voting-rights-by
-state-map.
In a few paragraphs, I’ll turn to the question whether a universalist law would be effective in
achieving that goal.
See Overton, supra note 121, at 24.
See Justin Levitt, VRA Preclearance (A Response to Pildes/Tokaji, pt. 2), ELECTION L. BLOG
(Aug. 19, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=54569.
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district-based to at-large elections, changing election dates, and so forth) that
dilute the voting strength of growing black and Latino communities.145 And the
actions taken by Kansas and Arizona to adopt separate registration systems for
state and federal elections146—which, in Arizona’s case, would likely have
drawn an objection under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act147—highlight the
limits of the Elections Clause in protecting voters in state and local elections.
All of this suggests that the universalist proposals offered by scholars like
Professors Issacharoff and Hasen—and Professor Pildes before them—rely on a
very partial understanding of what are “the voting problems of today.” By
focusing on voting-access rules, usually statewide, that are likely to be
consequential in national elections,148 those proposals do not address the
suppression of the effective power of minority voters on the local level. The
proposals also fail to address the way race discrimination can instantiate
differently in different times and places. A voter identification law may not be
especially burdensome for most voters in most places, but in some
communities the same law may be quite burdensome for an identifiable and
disproportionately minority-heavy group of voters. There may be no
universalistic reason why we should require states to hold early voting on
Sunday afternoons. But if the African American churches in a given state have
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See, e.g., Zachary Roth, Breaking Black: The Right-Wing Plot to Split a School Board, MSNBC,
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See Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273 (1997); Brenda Wright, Young v. Fordice, Challenging
Dual Registration Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 18 MISS. C. L. REV. 67 (1997).
Professors Issacharoff and Pildes are explicit in their focus on those decisions that are likely
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Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 104; Pildes, supra note 2, at 748-49.
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used early voting on Sunday afternoons to mobilize their parishioners to bring
their “souls to the polls,”149 we may legitimately fear that discrimination is
afoot when the state seeks to eliminate that early-voting opportunity.
And of course when we move from issues of vote denial to those of vote
dilution, universalistic approaches offer even less traction against race
discrimination (and Issacharoff, Pildes, and Hasen do not argue to the
contrary). In the abstract, at-large and district-based elections could both be
consistent with democratic theory or principles of good government. But if a
municipality changes from one to the other form of representation in response
to changing racial demographics, we may legitimately fear discrimination. A
universalist approach provides no basis to attack this sort of change—which is
an extremely common means by which minority voters are deprived of full and
equal participation in local democracy.
To be sure, this disagreement might simply be a normative one. Perhaps
those who urge a universalistic approach to voting rights after Shelby simply
are skeptical that vote dilution is a significant harm—or a harm as significant as
vote denial. Space constraints prevent me from offering a normative defense of
the importance of vote dilution here. For my purposes, the crucial point is to
highlight this normative disagreement. Those who believe that dilution causes
an important harm will be unable to agree that a law targeted at vote denial
best responds to “the voting problems of today.”
The fundamental insight of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was that
those who engage in race discrimination in elections are clever, so any attempt
to identify a set of forbidden voting practices will fail to combat discrimination
effectively.150 Professor Issacharoff recognizes that a “static regulatory
structure” will not address the problems in this context, because “electoral
politics is nothing if not dynamic.”151 But the principal substantive tool he and
Professor Hasen propose is a universalistic constitutional jurisprudence that
focuses on obstacles to registering and casting votes. That jurisprudence
cannot effectively respond to discrimination that (a) involves denying voting
opportunities that the courts are not prepared to guarantee universally;152 or
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See, e.g., Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Souls to the Polls: Early Voting in Florida in the
Shadow of House Bill 1355, 11 ELECTION L.J. 331 (2012).
See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966).
Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 117 (quoting Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer,
supra note 121, at 132).
Professor Issacharoff argues that the new equal protection jurisprudence avoids this
problem by “limit[ing] the prospects for strategic manipulation of access to the franchise by
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(b) involves vote dilution, not vote denial. This is a major substantive
limitation of the universalistic proposals.
Both Professor Issacharoff and Professor Hasen acknowledge that their
proposals will not fully address specifically racial discrimination in voting—
and, of course, both authors write against a backdrop in which section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act continues to provide nationwide protection against voting
discrimination. I think they do not face up to just how important a
phenomenon specifically racial discrimination continues to be, nor to the limits
of section 2 as a regulatory tool, though.153 In evaluating their proposals, then,
much rests on the viability of their tactical arguments. If a universalistic
approach would attack a meaningful slice of discriminatory conduct, and is the
most effective way to achieve that goal given current political and judicial
realties, it is worth supporting. But I believe the tactical arguments for the
universalist position are likely overblown.
In this regard, it is notable that the universalistic constitutional
jurisprudence that both Professor Issacharoff and Professor Hasen promote has
had only limited success—and no record of success in attacking the sorts of
vote-denial practices (felon disenfranchisement, voter identification laws) that
raise the most significant race discrimination concerns. The successful cases
were all decided by the Sixth Circuit, a court whose decisions are frequently
reversed by the Supreme Court,154 and the vitality of these cases outside of that
circuit has yet to be tested. For the most part, the cases have addressed
questions of statewide uniformity (such as the allocation of voting machines
out of proportion to the number of voters in different areas of the state155) or
relatively small-bore questions of election administration (involving such
matters as the rules for counting provisional ballots miscast due to poll-worker
error156). The most expansive of these cases, Obama for America v. Husted, did
address a limitation on early voting, but it merely affirmed a preliminary
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state officials” instead of “carv[ing] out new categories of specific entitlements.” Issacharoff,
Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 105. But, as I argue in the next few paragraphs, the
limits that this jurisprudence places on strategic manipulation are not likely to be great.
For a critique of Professor Issacharoff’s position along these lines, see Overton, supra note
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injunction, not a final judgment on the merits, and its holding may be limited
to the context of eleventh-hour changes in early voting for some but not all
voters.157
These Sixth Circuit cases are no doubt important for the voters and
candidates affected. And they do, to be sure, rely on important threads in the
extant Supreme Court cases.158 But their holdings are a long way from
requiring all voting restrictions to satisfy “a novel form of intermediate
scrutiny”159—much less “strict scrutiny light” (a standard Professor Hasen
draws from the dissent in an important voting case).160 Courts have tended to
resist imposing such heightened scrutiny on voting restrictions generally—
precisely because such a standard would seem to require judges to intervene in
a wide range of day-to-day voting decisions with no apparent discriminatory
intent or effect.161 This is a form of the dilution critique of universalism I
discussed above. If a universalistic approach to voting rights threatens to
require serious scrutiny of too broad a range of election-administration
decisions, courts are likely to ratchet down the effective level of scrutiny for
those decisions across the board.
And if judges and other actors will resist voting rights measures that target
race discrimination, it is doubtful that universalist approaches will avoid the
same fate. Judges may, indeed, be more likely to enforce a voting provision
targeted to race-based abuse, precisely because it is less destabilizing of the
electoral system.162 In any event, it is likely that universalist protections of the
right to vote will quickly become politically coded as being minority-targeted,
thus undermining the political benefits of the universal frame. Indeed,
opposition to voter identification laws already seems to have been politically
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coded in this way.163 And that same coding is likely to undermine the
expressivist effort to send a message of unity. The expressive harms or benefits
of a legal rule are, I have argued, likely to turn less on its form than on the
social and political context in which the rule is adopted.
In my view, although universalistic efforts to promote access to the ballot
are worthy, voting rights activists should not put most of their energies into
those sorts of efforts post-Shelby. Professor Issacharoff’s “smart disclosure”
regime makes sense—and is perhaps needed more at the local level than at the
state level. But the disclosure regime should be accompanied by rules that are
specifically directed at the problems of race discrimination in voting. Professor
Spencer Overton offers a number of good suggestions along these lines,
including: expanding the Voting Rights Act’s bail-in provision to subject
jurisdictions with a recent voting rights violation (even one that did not reflect
intentional discrimination) to preclearance; quicker procedures in Voting
Rights Act cases (perhaps including looser standards for obtaining preliminary
injunctions preserving the status quo); and adopting presumptions that
require states and localities that adopt voting rules that pose a special risk of
discrimination to “show in court that a change is fair and that less harmful
alternatives do not exist.”164 The proposed Voting Rights Act Amendments,
introduced in response to Shelby County, combine universalistic rules (such as
requiring disclosure of voting changes) with a continued use of a race-targeted
preclearance regime.165 Race-targeted approaches like these remain essential to
address the continuing problems of race discrimination in elections.
conclusion
The major goal of this essay has been to make a point about universalism
and civil rights. Many scholars and activists—including me—have urged
universalist responses to various civil rights problems. But universalism cannot
be a universal approach to civil rights. To decide whether it makes sense
requires careful attention to the strengths and weaknesses of the tactical,
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substantive, and expressive arguments for universalism in each particular
context in which universalist solutions are proposed. I have illustrated this
point with a discussion of the most prominent recent iteration of the
universalism debate in civil rights—the response to the Supreme Court’s Shelby
County decision. Although many prominent scholars have urged a universalist
response to that decision, I have argued, on substantive and tactical grounds,
that an effective response to the problems of voting discrimination continues to
require laws that target race discrimination directly.
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